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Air	 pollution	 and	 roadway	 congestion	 have	 become	increasingly	problematic	in	urban	environments,1	forc-ing	 lawmakers	 to	 search	 for	 an	 effective	 solution.2	
Governments	around	the	world	have	turned	to	taxation	and	pric-
ing	schemes,	both	as	a	means	of	funding	and	behavior	control;3	
however,	the	ability	of	these	methods	to	limit	negative	behavior	
by	reducing	traffic	and	curbing	automotive	emissions	remains	in	
question.4	Programs	that	assess	fees	on	drivers	for	using	urban	
roadways	 ensure	 a	 financial	 imposition	 on	 people	 traveling	
through	cities	but	may	not	effectively	reduce	congestion	or	air	
pollution.5	Lawmakers	must	also	consider	the	Constitutional	and	
economic	implications	of	such	laws	in	addition	to	their	environ-
mental	benefits.
In	2007,	New	York	City	Mayor	Michael	Bloomberg	pro-
posed	an	initiative	that	would	tax	motorists	entering	certain	parts	
of	the	city	in	an	effort	to	reduce	both	congestion	and	air	pollu-
tion.6	From	a	business	perspective,	the	tax	is	a	viable	method	of	
reducing	damage	to	the	environment	from	automotive	emissions	
and	finances	the	program	itself.7	However,	 the	tax	could	face	
several	Constitutional	 challenges,	 specifically	claims	brought	
under	 the	 Commerce	 Clause	 and	 42	U.S.C.	 §	 1983.8	 Under	
Mayor	Bloomberg’s	proposal,	New	York	City	would	charge	“an	
$8	fee	on	cars	entering	the	busiest	part	of	Manhattan	on	week-
days.”9	Presumably	this	regulation	would	affect	not	only	those	
individuals	who	live	in	New	York,	but	would	disproportionately	
affect	people	commuting	to	and	from	Manhattan	from	neighbor-
ing	states,	including	members	of	the	service	sector.10	Therefore,	
not	only	does	the	policy	fail	to	curb	the	targeted	behavior,	but	
members	of	adjacent	states	face	an	unequal	burden	to	those	indi-
viduals	located	within	New	York.11
In	1887,	 the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	 laid	 the	 foundation	 for	
this	issue	in	Philadelphia and Southern Steamship Company v. 
Pennsylvania	by	addressing	the	question	of	whether	a	state	may	
impose	upon	a	company	incorporated	under	 its	 laws	a	 tax	on	
their	gross	receipts	for	the	transport	of	persons	and	property.12	
The	 court	 defines	what	 constitutes	 a	 restriction	 on	 interstate	
commerce,	stating,	“[t]axing	the	transportation	.	.	.	would	cer-
tainly	be	a	regulation	of	the	commerce,	a	restriction	upon	it,	a	
burden	upon	it.”13	The	Court	then	notes	that	even	in	the	event	
Congress	 does	 not	make	 “express	 regulations	with	 regard	 to	
interstate	commerce,	its	inaction	.	.	.	is	equivalent	to	a	declara-
tion	that	it	shall	be	free”	of	further	regulation.14
Under	a	similar	 line	of	reasoning,	 the	Court	 in	Dennis v. 
Higgins	reversed	a	decision	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Nebraska,	
holding	 that	 retaliatory	 taxes	 and	 fees	 imposed	 by	 one	 state	
against	“motor	carriers”	registered	in	another	state	violated	the	
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Commerce	Clause.15	 Both	 the	Nebraska	 Supreme	Court	 and	
the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	agreed	that	in	this	particular	instance,	
the	 nature	 of	 the	 tax	 did	 violate	 the	 Commerce	 Clause,	 as	
it	 imposed	a	fee	only	on	carriers	“registered	outside	 the	state	
of	Nebraska	 .	 .	 .	 .”16	The	Court	clarifies	 that	while	 the	Com-
merce	Clause	only	addresses	Congressional	authority	to	regulate	
commerce,	 the	Court	has	historically	accepted	 the	 interpreta-
tion	that	this	delegation	of	power	acts	as	a	prohibition	against	
state	“barriers	against	 interstate	 trade.”17	However,	 the	courts	
split	as	to	whether	this	issue	was	an	actionable	claim	under	42	
U.S.C.	§1983,	with	the	final	decision	in	Dennis	finding	the	claim	
actionable	under	§1983.18	Like	 the	plaintiff	 in	Dennis,	out	of	
state	commuters	could	face	retaliatory	 taxes	since	congestion	
initiatives	disproportionately	affect	commuters	in	order	to	offset	
the	traffic	burdens	on	the	city.19
In	addition	to	Constitutional	obstacles,	 the	tax	could	also	
impose	disproportionate	economic	burdens.	Supporters	of	 the	
tax	suggest	that	the	burden	primarily	falls	on	the	wealthy,	as	they	
constitute	a	majority	of	the	inner	city	commuters.20	However,	
in	a	report	by	the	Committee	on	Corporations,	Authorities	and	
Commissions	of	the	New	York	State	Assembly,	the	Committee	
separated	the	cost	of	the	tax	in	relation	to	income,	finding	that	
for	residents	of	the	Bronx,	Brooklyn,	or	Queens,	the	tax	would	
amount	to	4.5	percent	of	their	annual	income	as	compared	to	2.5	
percent	for	residents	of	Westchester	or	Manhattan.21	The	Com-
mittee	also	found	that	despite	the	claims	of	tax	advocates,	“[r]
esidents	of	Queens,	the	Bronx,	Brooklyn	and	Staten	Island	who	
drive	in	the	Zone	[would]	pay	47%	of	the	total	fees	[compared	to]	
residents	of	Manhattan	who	drive	in	the	Zone	[and	would]	pay	
42%	of	the	total	fees.”22	Therefore,	according	to	the	Committee,	
the	burden	in	proportion	to	income	would	be	nearly	double	for	
residents	of	the	Bronx,	Brooklyn,	and	Queens.23	Therefore,	the	
tax	could	disproportionately	disadvantage	the	commuting	popu-
lations	of	neighboring	states	and	the	urban	poor.24
Initiatives	 on	 congestion	 pricing	 such	 as	Mayor	Bloom-
berg’s	and	those	in	place	in	London,	Singapore,	and	Stockholm	
pigeonhole	environmental	initiatives	into	a	tax	and	punish	for-
mat,	placing	an	inordinate	focus	on	the	ends	of	environmental	
protection	without	appreciating	the	opportunity	for	innovation	
and	the	costs	on	the	local	population.25
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